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Pride occurs in every known culture, appears early in develop-
ment, is reliably triggered by achievements and formidability, and
causes a characteristic display that is recognized everywhere.
Here, we evaluate the theory that pride evolved to guide decisions
relevant to pursuing actions that enhance valuation and respect
for a person in the minds of others. By hypothesis, pride is a
neurocomputational program tailored by selection to orchestrate
cognition and behavior in the service of: (i) motivating the cost-
effective pursuit of courses of action that would increase others’
valuations and respect of the individual, (ii) motivating the adver-
tisement of acts or characteristics whose recognition by others
would lead them to enhance their evaluations of the individual,
and (iii) mobilizing the individual to take advantage of the result-
ing enhanced social landscape. To modulate howmuch to invest in
actions that might lead to enhanced evaluations by others, the
pride system must forecast the magnitude of the evaluations the
action would evoke in the audience and calibrate its activation
proportionally. We tested this prediction in 16 countries across 4
continents (n = 2,085), for 25 acts and traits. As predicted, the
pride intensity for a given act or trait closely tracks the valuations
of audiences, local (mean r = +0.82) and foreign (mean r = +0.75).
This relationship is specific to pride and does not generalize to
other positive emotions that coactivate with pride but lack its
audience-recalibrating function.
pride | valuation | decision-making | emotion | culture
Our hominin ancestors evolved in a harsh and challengingworld characterized by high rates of mortality, high variance
in food acquisition (1), a high incidence of disease and injury (2),
and attacks by humans and nonhumans (3). Modern conditions
that buffer such risks (e.g., stored food, police) were absent, and to
a zoologically unusual degree, our ancestors relied on the other
members of the groups they lived in for the assistance necessary
for survival and reproduction. For example, provisioning the in-
jured with food—typical among humans—is entirely lacking
in nonhuman primates, who starve when incapacitated instead. In
humans, natural selection strongly favored the evolution of ad-
aptations in individuals to induce others to help them.
In general, there are two families of social tools organisms have
available for influencing others’ choices: first, they can condi-
tionally inflict costs—aggression; and second, they can bestow (or
withhold) benefits—altruism. The first causes individuals to be
respected (or feared). The second causes individuals to be valued.
It might be advantageous to put weight on another’s welfare
(i) because the individual is formidable and could inflict costs if
not propitiated, or (ii) because the individual’s actions or existence
make positive fitness contributions to the valuer, which would be
degraded or lost if assistance was not given. For convenience, here
we call these two components “respect” (for formidability) and
“valuation” (for positive fitness contributions). Being respected or
favorably valued by others were resources, and selection on our
ancestors would have shaped human social emotions to promote
access to these resources. More precisely, our ancestors’ survival
and reproduction sensitively depended on the extent to which
other group members placed weight on their welfare in making
decisions—that is, the degree to which others traded off or sacri-
ficed their own welfare for the welfare of the recipient (e.g., to keep
food for oneself or share it with one or more specific persons).
Because nonhumans are far more limited in the kinds of assis-
tance they can render each other, almost all nonhuman negotia-
tion is based on aggression. Differences in the ability to inflict costs
(formidability or resource holding power) led to adaptations for
the advertisement of formidability and adaptations for assessing
own and others’ formidability (4). In group-living species, domi-
nance hierarchies emerge from patterns of prudent deference to
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those with more formidability—individuals cede resources or rank
to avoid being harmed (5).
Although humans retain and exploit phylogenetically ancient
adaptations for aggression and dominance (including systems for
threat, fighting, display, and assessment) (4–7), human evolution
was distinctive in the greatly expanded role that mutual assis-
tance played in daily group living and, hence, in the reproductive
fortunes of individuals (7, 8). The hominin entry into the cog-
nitive niche (involving the emergence and integration of intelli-
gence, language, tool use, coordination, and culture) greatly
amplified the opportunities for mutually advantageous prosocial
interactions (9, 10). As our ancestors entered the cognitive niche
and became hunter-gatherers, there would have been novel and
intense selection for adaptations designed to make the self
valuable to others and, hence, recruit assistance from others. We
hypothesize that the emotion of pride functions as an evolved
guidance system that modulates behavior to cost-effectively
manage and capitalize on the propensities of others to value or
respect the actor.
For behavior to succeed in making the self more valuable to or
respected by others, others must have neural programs to value
and trade off welfare in favor of conspecifics. The properties of
these programs in the minds of others constitute the task envi-
ronment that the pride system evolved to exploit. Indeed, over the
last half-century, evolutionary biologists have developed theories
of how a number of different selection pressures favor the evo-
lution of mechanisms designed to value the welfare of others and
to (within limits) sacrifice self for others. These theories include
kin selection (11), reciprocation (12, 13), reputation (14–16), risk-
pooling (1, 17, 18), externality management (19), and (substituting
deference for valuation) the asymmetric war of attrition (20).
These theories in aggregate require the existence of an evolved,
human-universal neurocognitive architecture for computing the
social value of others to oneself, and an architecture that governs
the extent to which the self will trade his or her welfare in favor of
others’ welfare (21–23). Moreover, these theories led to the em-
pirical discovery of an array of specialized choice architectures
that implement welfare–tradeoff decisions given the information
available to the actor about an interaction partner [e.g., how to
respond to cues of the recipient’s relatedness, skills, generosity,
attractiveness, ability to defend her interests, etc. (6, 24–28)]. Each
specific theory provides contentful predictions about the dimen-
sions of the psychology of valuation in our species that the pride
system targets (e.g., productivity, generosity, bravery, strength,
health, and attractiveness).
The Advertisement-Recalibration Theory of Pride
According to what we will call the “advertisement–recalibration
theory of pride,” pride is an evolved human-universal neuro-
computational program that was designed by natural selection to
orchestrate cognition, physiology, and behavior in the service of
(i) motivating the individual to choose courses of action or the
acquisition of traits where the prospective benefits of increased
valuation and respect exceed the costs, (ii) advertising positive
information about the self so that it reaches others more reliably,
and (iii) capitalizing on the benefits of increased valuation and
respect in others (see also refs. 5, 7, 29, and 30). Dynamically,
others’ assessments of the acts and characteristics of an indi-
vidual lead them to value (or devalue) him or her. When others
(an audience) detect new information about an individual that is
at odds with the audience’s current level of valuation, they
recalibrate the value assigned to that person either upward or
downward, with correspondingly positive or negative effects on
their disposition to aid or defer to that individual. This adaptive
problem, in turn, would have selected for the motivational sub-
components of the pride system. First, pride should be designed
to anticipate how an audience would modify its evaluation in
response to an action, and should make more value- or deference-
promoting actions feel more rewarding and more attractive in
prospect. This design feature helps the choice system determine
which achievements are worth the effort. This planning stage is
one component in which pride as a feeling is experienced, so
higher paying courses of action are chosen over lower paying ones.
Second, pride should be designed to facilitate the transfer of
favorable information to the relevant audience, so members of the
audience can recalibrate valuation and respect upward. Third,
when others register one’s achievements or dominance and reca-
librate upwards, the individual needs to recalibrate her own model
of how much others now value her (31) and her entitlement to
favorable treatment (6). This representation of the degree of
welfare tradeoffs the individual is entitled to modulates how the
individual will capitalize on others’ revised valuations. This is an-
other stage where feeling pride happens: One cannot, for example,
choose to be the child of someone important, but it is adaptive for
the person to recognize the way this attribute increases how others
value them. Assimilating this heightened valuation or deference
allows individuals to pursue social opportunities previously beyond
reach (7, 29, 30) or to press for better treatment from others (32).
Computationally, the underlying social valuation system needs a
database of values matched to actions (e.g., gives food) and traits
(e.g., daughter of headman) that can be accessed by the pride
system and the system that values individuals. Entries in this da-
tabase could be culturally acquired, but given the endless number
of potential acts, it is likely that various species-typical adaptations
involving social valuation (the mating system, the formidability-
assessment system, the social exchange system, etc.) can inferen-
tially generate probable values even in the absence of prior exposure
to local valuation. This hypothesis would predict commonalities
from culture to culture in what makes humans proud and what makes
them value others.
Existing findings on pride are consistent with the advertise-
ment–recalibration theory. Pride-driven choices and pride displays
occur in every known culture (33) and appear reliably and early in
development (34–36). Pride is triggered by achievements (35, 37),
aggressive formidability (38, 39), and other factors of social value
such as attractiveness and membership in a powerful coalition
(40). The feeling of pride is highly pleasurable (41). This internal
reward can motivate people to undertake and persevere at costly
but socially valued courses of action (42–44). Pride has a full-body
display featuring an erect and expanded posture, with gaze di-
rected at the audience, and bodily relaxation (5, 34, 45). This
display conveys achievement and dominance (5, 7, 46) and reflects
both short-term and long-term successes (37, 47); thus, the pride
display is attractive to potential mates (48), a cue to choose
partners, and intimidating to rivals (5, 49), which may have the
effect of reducing aggression (20) and stabilizing a dominance
hierarchy. The behavioral display of pride, which derives from
dominance and deference systems, is zoologically widespread, not
only among nonhuman primates (50) but in a wide range of taxa,
including invertebrates (51); thus, it is phylogenetically ancient
(for similarities and differences between human and nonhuman
status, see refs. 5, 7, and 39).
The pride display appears to generate common knowledge of
enhanced value (52), is produced even by congenitally blind indi-
viduals (38), and is recognizable by young children (53) and by
adults within and across cultures (45, 54). Cultural differences in
pride exist (41, 55–57). However, theoretical considerations (58)
and empirical data (59–61) suggest that these differences result
from (for example) differences in what audiences value in others
(i.e., the weights attached to the inputs of the pride mechanism)
rather than differences in the cognitive architecture of pride. Indeed,
cross-cultural evidence has recently provided support for the hy-
pothesis that the complementary emotion of shame is an adaptation
that evolved to deter actions where the costs of devaluation by others
exceed the benefits, to prevent audiences from receiving negative
information about the individual that would lead to devaluation, and
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to buffer against devaluation if the negative information does spread
(22). Pride serves analogous functions with respect to positive in-
formation that leads to enhanced valuation or respect. We note that
human pride and its obverse, shame, are evolutionarily derived from
regulatory systems for dominance and submission (5, 7, 8), and
various aspects of those emotions (e.g., the displays) are homologous
to those of simians (5). For example, receiving a pride display may
elicit submission, whereas receiving a shame display terminates ag-
gression; thus, these conjugated systems reduce overt conflict and
further attacks (5, 62) (for a nonhuman example, see ref. 63).
The decision-making architecture of a social organism should
evaluate and integrate two kinds of payoffs to regulate behavior
adaptively: (i) the direct payoff of the potential action (e.g., the
value of foraging for a food item), and (ii) the social valuation
payoff [e.g., showing bandmates that one is a skilled forager (64)].
According to the advertisement–recalibration theory, the antici-
pated feeling of pride is the readout of the estimated social val-
uation payoff, which must be added to the direct payoff to get the
full value of a candidate course of action. (Given its role in
planning, this feeling may occur even in the absence of an audi-
ence.) For the organism to adaptively modulate how much effort
and risk to invest in actions whose benefits lie in the changed
evaluations of others, the pride system must forecast the magni-
tude of the evaluations the action would evoke in the audience
and calibrate its activation proportionally. The underactivation of
pride leads to maladaptive choices where (i) the acts with high
social payoffs are insufficiently pursued, (ii) achievements or de-
sirable traits are insufficiently advertised and, hence, trigger less
upward valuation recalibration in the audience, and (iii) the in-
dividual does not take advantage of the extent to which others
value her. Conversely, an overactivation of pride yields diminish-
ing or even negative returns, because beneficial courses of action
are overpursued, and, moreover, audiences’ evaluations become
less favorable to the individual, because others are designed to
resist and devalue excessive advertisement and entitled actions
that exceed the individual’s actual social value (65–67). [Given the
self-interest bias, some opportunistic status overclaiming may be
expected (68), although repeated interactions in naturalistic con-
texts will constrain such excessive claims.] To balance these
competing demands, pride should deploy in lockstep with the
valuation that is prevalent in audiences drawn from the individ-
ual’s (local) social ecology. Indeed, because decisions about ac-
tions must be made in advance of observing feedback about one’s
actions, pride feelings should forecast, and track in intensity, the
magnitude of others’ evaluative recalibrations for a given act or
trait (22). We test this basic design feature in 16 countries across
4 continents.
Study 1
To test the prediction that the intensity of felt pride tracks the
valuations of local audiences, we recruited 1,458 participants from
the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium,
The Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Turkey, Israel, India, Singapore,
the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, and Australia. Inattentive par-
ticipants were excluded from analyses, leaving a total effective sample
of 1,348 (Studies 1a–1p). We created 25 scenarios in which some-
one’s acts, traits, or circumstances might lead them to be viewed
positively. The scenarios were designed to elicit reactions in a wide
range of evolutionarily relevant domains, such as social exchange,
skills, aggressive contests, mating, parenting, and leadership.
Participants completed one of two between-subjects conditions:
an “audience” condition and a “pride” condition. Participants in
the audience condition were asked to provide their reactions to 25
scenarios involving a third party: an individual other than them-
selves who is of the same sex and age as the participant (e.g., “She
is trustworthy,” “She has many unique skills,” “She is physically
attractive”). Participants in the audience condition were asked to
“indicate how you would view [someone of your same sex and age]
if they were in those situations,” using scales ranging from 1
(I wouldn’t view them positively at all) to 7 (I’d view them very
positively). These ratings provide a measure of the degree to
which members of a given population would value the individual
described in the scenarios.
In the pride condition, a different set of participants was asked
to “indicate how much pride you would feel if you were in those
situations” (i.e., in each of the 25 scenarios; e.g., “You are trust-
worthy,” “You have many unique skills,” “You are physically at-
tractive”), with scales ranging from 1 (no pride at all) to 7 (a lot of
pride). The stimuli in the audience and pride conditions were
identical on a scenario-by-scenario basis, the only difference being
the perspective from which the events are described.
If, as argued above, a human-universal grammar of social value
exists, then this hypothesis raises the expectation—in contrast to
traditional anthropological expectation—that many things that are
viewed as socially valuable, and hence pride-eliciting, will be
shared across cultures rather than unique to each culture. If pride
is an adaptation for recalibrating the valuations of local audiences,
and some values are universally held (i.e., by local and foreign
audiences), then the intensity of pride these scenarios elicit in a
given country should track the degree of valuation they elicit in the
other countries.
Within-Country Results. First, we report the valuation and pride
results for each country. Full text of the scenarios and descriptive
statistics are provided in SI Appendix, Table S2 a–p.
There is widespread agreement on how valuation-enhancing
these situations are relative to one another: mean intraclass cor-
relation across the 16 countries: ICC (2,n) = 0.95 (SI Appendix,
Table S3). Participants agree also about the extent to which they
would feel pride in these situations: mean ICC (2,n) = 0.92 (SI
Appendix, Table S3). To test the main prediction that pride tracks
audience valuation, we calculated, for each scenario, the mean
pride ratings provided by participants in the pride condition, and
the mean valuation ratings provided by participants in the audi-
ence condition. Pride and valuation means are highly correlated
with one another within each country, with a mean r = 0.82 (SD =
0.05; minimum r = 0.72; maximum r = 0.90; N r values = 16);
P values = 10−9–10−4 (Fig. 1 and diagonal values in SI Appendix,
Table S4). Scenario 11 (pride condition: “You get into a fight in
front of everybody, and you completely dominate your opponent
with punch after punch, until your opponent is knocked out”) is a
low outlier in various samples—perhaps because these samples
come from pacified populations (69). Excluding this scenario from
analysis does not substantially change the pride–valuation corre-
lations, however, mean r = 0.77 (SD = 0.09; minimum r = 0.55;
maximum r = 0.88; N r values = 16); P values = 10−7–0.005. All
reported correlations remain significant after applying a false-
discovery rate (FDR) correction (70) of P < 0.05, unless otherwise
noted. Recall that the pride and valuation ratings originate from
different sets of participants. Consequently, these high correla-
tions cannot be attributed to participants matching their pride and
valuation ratings.
Between-Country Results. Some actions, traits, and situations elicit
valuation in some cultures but not others (64, 71). However, if the
machinery for computing the social value of others is species-
typical, then there will be situations that provoke valuation, and
elicit pride, across cultures (33, 41). To test for between-country
agreement in valuation, in pride, and in the pride–valuation link,
we computed the extent to which the mean valuation ratings and
the mean pride ratings are correlated across countries. Supporting
the hypothesis of a species-wide grammar of social value, there is a
high degree of between-country agreement on the extent to which
a given situation would elicit positive valuation: mean r = 0.90
(SD = 0.06; minimum r= 0.73; maximum r= 0.98; N r values= 120);
P values = 10−17–10−4 (SI Appendix, Table S5). There is also high
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between-country agreement on the extent to which a given situa-
tion would elicit pride: mean r = 0.81 (SD = 0.11; minimum r =
0.51; maximum r = 0.97; N r values = 120); P values = 10−14–0.009
(SI Appendix, Table S6). Furthermore, as predicted, the pride
elicited in each of the 16 countries is positively correlated with the
valuations from the other 15 countries: mean r = 0.75 (SD = 0.09;
minimum r = 0.48; maximum r = 0.93; N r values = 240); P values =
10−10–0.017 (off-diagonal values in SI Appendix, Table S4). Note
that the proportion of variance in pride accounted for by the
valuations of foreign audiences (mean: 56%) is close to that
accounted for by the valuations of local audiences (mean: 67%).
Excluding scenario 11 from analysis does not substantially alter
the between-country pride–valuation correlations: mean r = 0.69
(SD = 0.13; minimum r = 0.29; maximum r = 0.90; N r values =
240); P values = 10−8–0.17; 222 of these 240 correlations (92.5%
of them) remain significant at FDR P < 0.05.
Study 2
If it is pride, in particular, that aims to recalibrate audiences,
then audience valuation should be tracked more closely by pride
than by other emotions that are positive and arousing (as pride
is) but not designed for recalibrating audiences. To evaluate this
prediction, we conducted a follow-up study in the United States
and India (Studies 2a and 2b; n = 361). There were five between-
subjects conditions: one audience condition assessing valuation
and four emotion conditions: pride, excitement, amusement, and
happiness. Excitement, amusement, and happiness were chosen
because these three emotions often coactivate with pride and,
like pride, are positive and arousing (41, 72–74).
The scenarios, as well as the descriptive statistics for each scenario
and each country, are provided in SI Appendix, Table S7 a and b.
Pride tracked audience valuation, and it did so better than
amusement, excitement, and happiness did. The extent to which a
scenario would elicit valuation in an audience positively predicted the
intensity of pride participants would feel when imagining themselves
in that scenario [r(23) = 0.77, P = 10−5 (India); r(23) = 0.81, P = 10−6
(United States)]. Valuation and amusement correlated in India
[r(23) = 0.58, P = 0.003] but not in the United States [r(23) = 0.02,
P = 0.92]. Valuation and excitement correlated marginally in
India [r(23) = 0.36, P = 0.07] but did not correlate in the United
States [r(23) = 0.14, P = 0.51]. Valuation and happiness correlated in
India [r(23) = 0.76, P = 10−5] and the United States [r(23) = 0.72,
P = 10−4]. We note that pride correlated with excitement [United
States: r(23) = 0.47, P = 0.018; India: r(23) = 0.66, P = 0.0003],
with happiness [United States: r(23) = 0.88, P = 10−8; India:
r(23) = 0.77, P = 10−5], and with amusement in India [r(23) =
0.66, P = 0.0003], although not in the United States [r(23) = 0.19,
P = 0.36]. Recall that the valuation, pride, amusement, excitement,
and happiness ratings originated from different participants.
To more clearly assess the associations between the emotions
and valuation, we regressed valuation simultaneously on pride,
amusement, excitement, and happiness. Pride continued to predict
valuation even after controlling for the other three emotions [β =
0.59, P = 0.004 (India); β = 0.86, P = 0.007 (United States)].
Amusement did not display unique associations with valuation [β =
0.07, P = 0.72 (India); β = 0.04, P = 0.84 (United States)]. Ex-
citement negatively predicted valuation; significantly in India (β =
−0.47, P = 0.012) and marginally in the United States (β = −0.35,
P = 0.06). Happiness uniquely and positively predicted valuation
after controlling for the other three emotions; in India (β = 0.57,
P = 0.015) but not in the United States (β = 0.12, P = 0.68). Given
the intercorrelations between our predictor variables, we examined
the variance inflation factor (VIF) associated with each predictor
to assess potential multicollinearity. All VIFs for both analyses
were less than 6.6 and thus did not exceed the commonly accepted
maximum of 10 (75).
In sum, the match between audience valuation and pride is spe-
cific; it does not generalize to amusement, excitement, or happiness,
even when the latter coactivate with pride.
If pride recalibrates audience valuation to augment one’s wel-
fare, and fitness, then pride should be tuned specifically to the
valuations of those who, upon receiving information revelatory of
gains in one’s social value or formidability, would impact one’s
welfare—local audiences. Pride will track the valuations of foreign
audiences, but only to the extent that foreign and local audiences
agree in their valuations. When they disagree, the relationship
between pride and foreign valuation should dissolve. To test this
prediction, we conducted a follow-up study in the United States
and India using scenarios constructed to elicit (i) similar levels of
pride in the United States and India, (ii) more pride in the United
States, or (iii) more pride in India—the latter two types of sce-
narios were based on an anthropological report (76) and advice
from bicultural informants (SI Appendix, 2. Study S1. Pride and
Culture-Specific Valuation and Tables S8 and S9; n = 266). As
predicted, pride tracked the valuation of foreign audiences when
the valuations of foreign and local audiences were correlated, but
it failed to track foreign audiences for scenarios that led to dif-
ferent evaluations in the United States and India.
Discussion
These findings support the hypothesis that pride is an adaptation
for cost-effectively promoting increases in others’ valuations or
respect for the individual. In particular, we showed that pride in the
individual closely tracks the valuations of audiences in the indi-
vidual’s social ecology. Furthermore, pride is specific to audience
valuation: Emotions that coactivate with pride, such as happiness
and excitement, do not track audience valuation uniquely and reliably.
These data suggest that pride, rather than other positive emotions, is
distinctively involved in enhancing social valuation. Further evidence
to demonstrate domain-specificity is needed, however.
The intensity of pride in prospect tracks audience evaluations,
even though those ratings originate from different sets of individuals.
For pride to track evaluations, the pride system must possess
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Fig. 1. Studies 1a–1p. Scatter plots: pride as a function of valuation. Each
point represents the mean valuation rating and mean pride rating of one
scenario. Valuation and pride ratings were given by different participants
(n = 25 scenarios; effect size: R2 linear). (A) United States (US). (B) Canada (CA).
(C ) United Kingdom (GB). (D) France (FR). (E ) Belgium (BE). (F ) The Neth-
erlands (NL). (G) Switzerland (CH). (H) Italy (IT). (I) Turkey (TR). (J) Israel (IL).
(K) India (IN). (L) Singapore (SG). (M) Philippines (PH). (N) South Korea (KR).
(O) Japan (JP). (P) Australia (AU).
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accurate information about the degree to which the local audience
will evaluate individuals as a function of their acts or traits. Con-
siderations of parsimony suggest that both are informed by a com-
mon underlying architecture of social valuation.
The cross-cultural agreement on pride, valuation, and their in-
terrelationship is noteworthy. Nonevolutionary views conceptual-
ize cultures as being richly different from each other (77). If this
hypothesis were true, then what cultures value and what makes
members of different cultures proud should be substantially dif-
ferent. Indeed, pride has been argued to heavily rely on culture-
specific schemas (55, 57, 78). One application of this argument is
that in collectivist cultures such as Japan, where the self is con-
strued as an interdependent entity, people do not strive to main-
tain a positive view of the self; they do not “self-enhance” (79).
Instead, people strive to be modest, save face, and improve
themselves (80) to harmoniously fit in the collective (81). Con-
sistent with this view, Japan has the third-lowest pride grand mean
and the lowest valuation grand mean—although we note that
ratings of pride and valuation may not be directly comparable
across countries (79). However, the relative pride elicited by the
25 scenarios among the Japanese, and in the other collectivist
samples, substantially tracked how positively people in other
countries would view individuals in those scenarios, whether those
countries were individualist or collectivist [e.g., the United States vs.
South Korea (82)]. These data are unlikely if people in East-Asian
or collectivist cultures truly lack self-enhancement (83). How-
ever, if (i) pride is a human-universal adaptation designed to in-
crease the valuation or respect conferred by members of one’s
local social ecology, and (ii) there is a species-wide architecture of
social valuation, drawing on a species-typical array of evaluative
adaptations for mating, social exchange, skills, and so on, then
there ought to be robust similarities from culture to culture in
pride, valuation, and their relationship. This view explains not only
the high degree of within-culture consistency but also the between-
culture consistency that we predicted and found.
The current results help to locate pride within a functionally
interlinked architecture of social emotions that also includes
shame, anger, and gratitude. Although each of these emotions
has different hypothesized evolved functions, they all depend on
an underlying evolved welfare–tradeoff psychology (21). Briefly,
under the welfare–tradeoff framework (84, 85), the function of
shame is to limit information-triggered reductions in the weight
placed on one’s welfare by others; the function of anger is to
incentivize others to place a higher weight on one’s welfare when
that weight is deemed insufficiently low; the function of gratitude
is to consolidate a higher level of cooperation when the system
detects that an unexpectedly high weight has been put on one’s
welfare; the function of pride, as argued above, is to motivate the
individual to both achieve and advertise traits or acts so that
others place a higher weight on his or her welfare.
People dislike the social subordination that sometimes follows
others’ increases in status, and in rivalrous zero-sum settings the
mere success of others is experienced as a grievance (86, 87).
Occasionally, pride overactivates and causes an excessive sense
of entitlement. Perhaps for these reasons, pride has long been
deemed potentially problematic, even a sin (30). However, an
evolutionary–functional analysis suggests a different view: This
emotion is the expression of an evolved system that promotes the
pursuit of socially valued courses of action and facilitates the
gains in valuation that make those actions worth pursuing.
Methods
The study procedures were approved by the institutional review boards at
the University of California, Santa Barbara; the Ben-Gurion University of the
Negev; Griffith University; Singapore Management University and the
Graduate School of Humanities, Kobe University; the Research Ethics Com-
mittee, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen; the
Departmental Research Ethics Committee, Anthropology, University of Ox-
ford; and the Ethics Board, Bilkent University. All of the participants com-
pleted electronic informed consent.
Study 1.
Samples for Study 1. We collected data from 1,458 participants in the United
States (Study 1a), Canada (Study 1b), the United Kingdom (Study 1c), France
(Study 1d), Belgium (Study 1e), The Netherlands (Study 1f), Switzerland
(Study 1g), Italy (Study 1h), Turkey (Study 1i), Israel (Study 1j), India (Study
1k), Singapore (Study 1l), Philippines (Study 1m), South Korea (Study 1n),
Japan (Study 1o), and Australia (Study 1p). The numbers of participants were
120 (United States), 29 (Canada), 86 (United Kingdom), 168 (France), 89
(Belgium), 60 (The Netherlands), 59 (Switzerland), 47 (Italy), 131 (Turkey),
105 (Israel), 120 (India), 135 (Singapore), 39 (Philippines), 37 (South Korea),
200 (Japan), and 33 (Australia). On average, 6% of each sample was ex-
cluded from analyses due to failure to correctly respond to an attention
check. One Italian participant may have taken the study twice; removing
that presumptive data leaves the results virtually unchanged. Participants
were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) or other survey compa-
nies (United States, Canada, United Kingdom, India, Philippines, and Japan),
subject pool announcement and other types of communications to students
(France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy, Israel, Singapore, and Australia),
and social networks (The Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and South
Korea). For demographic information and effective sample sizes, see SI
Appendix, Table S1.
Measures. The 25 scenarios are shown in SI Appendix, Table S2 a–p. Participants
were randomly assigned to either the audience condition or the pride condi-
tion. Participants indicated their sex at the outset and the scenarios were sexed
appropriately. The order in which the scenarios were presented was random
across participants. The stimuli were presented in English (United States,
Canada, United Kingdom, India, Singapore, Philippines, and Australia), French
(France and Switzerland), Dutch (Belgium and The Netherlands), Italian (Italy),
Turkish (Turkey), Hebrew (Israel), Korean (South Korea), and Japanese (Japan).
Study 2.
Samples for Study 2.AMTwas used to recruit 203 participants in the United States
(Study 2a). One of the participants was removed from analyses due to failure to
correctly respond to an attention check, leaving an effective sample size of 202
(120 females), with a mean age of 38 y (SD = 13). AMT was used to recruit 158
participants in India (Study 2b). Eleven of them were removed from analyses
due to failure to correctly respond to an attention check, leaving an effective
sample size of 147 (50 females), with a mean age of 33 y (SD = 9).
Measures. Studies 2a and 2bhad five between-subjects conditions: one audience
condition assessing valuation and four emotion conditions: pride, amusement,
excitement, and happiness. The scenarios were the same as in Studies 1a–1p.
The stimuli were presented in English in the United States and India.
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